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THE JUVENILE OFFENDER ACT: 
EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPACT ON THE 
NEW YORK JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
MERRIL SOBIE * 
The Juvenile Offender Act of 1978 incorporates the most radi- 
cal and perhaps the most controversial amendments to New York's 
juvenile delinquency statutes in several decades. For the first time 
since 1909, children accused of committing serious offenses are 
subject to prosecution in the criminal courts. The gradual decrimi- 
nalization of delinquency, which began a century and a half ago, 
has been reversed. 
This report analyzes and evaluates the Act and its implementa- 
tion. The first two sections summarize the historical development of 
juvenile delinquency legislation and compare present New York 
provisions to those in other states. Sections I11 and IV will evaluate 
the Act's implementation throughout the criminal and juvenile 
systems. Recommendations to amend the Act in the last section are 
largely predicated on the experience to date in applying the statute 
to youths accused of committing juvenile offenses. 
I. THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The juvenile justice movement dates from the early nine- 
teenth-century development of the prison system as a substitute for 
physical punishment.' Under common law, a child below the age 
of seven could not be criminally prosecuted, while a youth between 
the ages of seven and fourteen was presumed to lack criminal 
~apac i ty ,~  a presumption only infrequently rebutted. Children 
above the age of fourteen bore full criminal resp~nsibility,~ al- 
though punishment could always be mitigated. Prior to the nine- 
teenth century, criminal punishment was swift and physical in 
nature, and imprisonment was ~ n k n o w n . ~  
* Professor, Pace University School of Law. 
* *  Professor Sobie gratefully acknowvledges the aid of Lee Elliott in the drafting of this 
article, as well as the financial aid supplied by the Foundation for Child Development. 
1. See generally Mark, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909). 
2. Prevezer, A Historical Summay of the English Juvenile Court System and an Assess- 
ment of Its Features in the Light of American Practice, 4 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 3 (1957). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 4 .  
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In the absence of incarceration, the "mixing" of juvenile of- 
fenders with adults in common facilities was impossible. Equally, 
the absence of physical custody precluded the implementation of 
rehabilitative programs tailored to the young transgressor, the hall- 
mark of the twentieth-century juvenile justice s y ~ t e m . ~  
In the early nineteenth century, reforms led to the establish- 
ment of the prison system, resulting for the first time, in the incar- 
ceration of youths with more hardened adult  criminal^.^ Joint 
imprisonment created the possibility of separate ameliorative pro- 
grams. As early as 1819, when sentencing procedures were still in 
their infancy, an official New York City commission advocated the 
establishment of separate juvenile facilities while describing the 
New York penitentiary in vivid terms: 
Until recently, boys from 10 to 18 years of age were 
placed in a large apartment with hoary-headed felons, 
who had grown grey in vice and deprivation, there to 
listen to their sarcasms on morality, their jests upon reli- 
gion, or to oaths, imprecations and blasphemies. At 
present, the young and adult felons and convicts are in 
some degree separated, and partial instructions afforded to 
the former. We are sorry to be informed, by the mayor, 
that since he has administered our criminal jurisprudence, 
the unpleasant task has descended on him of sentencing 
boys from 12 to 15 and 17 years of age several times to the 
penitentiary . . . , [I]f anything can destroy the ingenu- 
ousness and rectitude of youth and open a road to ruin, it is 
the polluting society of those veterans in guilt and wicked- 
ness who hold their rein in our prisons of punishmenL7 
Responding in 1824, the legislature enacted the first New York 
juvenile delinquency statute.* The Act established the "society for 
the reformation of juvenile delinquents in the city of New York," 
(Society) an organization devoted to the rehabilitation of delin- 
quents. Criminal courts were allowed to place children below the 
age of sixteen with the Society in lieu of impri~onment.~ 
5. Id. at 6-8. 
6. In 1796 the New York Legislature authorized the construction of the state's first 
prison, a facility which initially housed both adults and children. 1796 N.Y. Laws, ch. 30. 
7. THE SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE MANAGERS OFTHE SOCIEIY FOR THE PREVENTION OF 
P A U P ~ S M  IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1819), quoted in P. TAPPAN, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
391 (1949) [hereinafter cited as TAPPAN]. 
8. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform, An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 
1188-93 (1970). 
9. 1824 N.Y. Laws, ch. 126. The widely held view that the juvenile justice system 
commenced in 1902 with the establishment of the Manhattan "children's court" or the 1899 
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The Society's purpose was rehabilitative. Its statutory grant of 
custody continued only until boys reached the age of twenty-one 
and girls reached the age of eighteen. As a result, most juveniles 
were placed in short-term rehabilitative programs under Society 
auspices. lo The long-term incarceration of children became the 
exception, although still possible under the 1824 Act. 
Thus, since 1824, New York has differentiated between the 
youthful offender and the adult. A majority of children, including 
those who committed the most violent acts, were henceforth placed 
in Society facilities.ll The age limit of sixteen was to continue for 
over one hundred and fifty years, until blurred by the passage of 
the 1978 Juvenile Offender Act. 
The policy of differentiating between the child and the adult 
criminal was given statewide application in 1840 with the passage 
of the following statute: 
Whenever any person under the age of sixteen years, shall 
be convicted of any felony or other crime, the court, in- 
stead of sentencing such person to imprisonment in a state 
prison, or county jail may order that he be removed to and 
confined in the house of refuge, established by the society 
for the reformation of juvenile delinquents.12 
The ability of the courts to place children in special facilities 
was further assisted by the establishment of a juvenile asylum (later 
known as Children's Village) at Dobbs Ferry in 1851. This facility 
was specifically geared to the very young and less serious of- 
fenders.13 The "Western House of Refuge" was established in 
Rochester to house delinquents from upstate areas.14 
organization of the Cook County Juvenile Court in Chicago is based on the misconception 
that prior to the establishment of separate juvenile courts, children were held to be criminally 
responsible and subject to full adult sentencing. See Woods, New York's Juvenile Offender 
Law: An Overview and Analysis, 9 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1, 4-5 (1980). See also 12 Z m ,  
EDMONDS, BUTIREY dr KAUEMAN, .Y. CIV. h c .  5 103 (1981); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) 
"From the juvenile court statute adopted in Illinois in 1899, the system has spread to every 
State in the Union, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico." Id. 
10. See R. PIC=, HOUSE OF REFUGE; ORIGINS OF JUVENILE REFORM 1815-1857, at 67-85 
(1969). 
11. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 175. The establishment of the "House of Refuge" has been 
characterized as "the first great event in child welfare." I. SCHNEIDER, THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC 
WELFARE IN Nmv YO=, 1609-1860, at 317 (1938). 
12. 1840 N.Y. Laws, ch. 100. 
13. TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 175. The segregation of the child offender does not mean, 
however, that he was treated benevolently, at least according to twentieth-century stand- 
ards. The early houses of refuge or asylums treated children harshly and provided rigorous 
discipline. See Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 
1187; 1193-95 (197.0). 
14. 1848 N.Y. Laws, ch. 143. Pursuant to this legislation the courts were apparently 
required to sentence all delinquents to the house of refuge. Id. 
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In 1875 the legislature also required that a child below the age 
of sixteen be detained in a facility separate from adult jails, pro- 
vided such a facility was locally available.15 The 1875 Act, there- 
fore, represented the first mandatory separation of the juvenile 
from the adult criminal. Ironically, the pretrial separation of chil- 
dren was to a large extent honored in the breach until recent years. 
By the late nineteenth century, a complicated juvenile justice 
system had evolved as a separate branch of the criminal court 
system. The possibility of a full criminal sentence remained, but 
several other available options were widely used. First, a child 
under the age of fourteen, charged with a felony other than a 
capital crime, could "in the discretion of the court, be tried as for a 
misdemeanor, and the court . . . [could] impose the penalty as 
prescribed by a law in the case of misdemeanors."le Second, any 
child between the ages of twelve and sixteen, who committed a 
crime, including a capital offense, could be placed with a house of 
refuge, the state industrial school, or other delinquent program 
such as Children's Village." On the other hand, a child less than 
twelve could not be committed to a house of refuge or industrial 
school,18 but only to an asylum (e.g.,  Children's Village) or private 
program suitable for younger delinquents.19 In short, children 
under the age of sixteen were placed in accordance with a sophisti- 
cated statutory pattern that was vastly different from the adult 
sentencing authority. 
At the turn of the century, the concept of a separate juvenile 
court also began to emerge. By then, the routine placement of 
children in rehabilitative programs and the practice of charging 
many juvenile offenders with misdemeanors regardless of the actual 
crime committed inevitably raised questions concerning the contin- 
ued practice of hearing delinquency cases in courts devoted to adult 
felony matters. 
In 1902, the Manhattan "Children's Court" was established 
through the amendment of the New York City Charter.20 Al- 
15. 1875 N.Y. Laws, ch. 464, Q 2. 
16. 1896 N.Y. Laws, ch. 553, Q 699. 
17. Id. ch. 546, Q 124. See also id. ch. 554, 5 701. 
18. Id. ch. 546 Q 124. 
19. 1897 N.Y. Laws, ch. 428 4. There was also a provision that "[nlo child under 
restraint or conviction, apparently under the age of fourteen years, shall be placed in any 
prison or place of confinement . . . except in the presence of a proper official," but its 
application is unclear. Id. However, a child who had been placed with a house of refuge or 
an industrial school could be transferred to the Elmira Reformatory, a prison which housed 
the older adolescent offenders, after a court hearing, for defying the lawful authority of the 
institution or who through "gross or habitual misconduct excert[s] [sic] a dangerous and 
pernicious influence over the other delinquents." 1896 N.Y. Laws, ch. 546, Q 128. 
20. GREATER NEW YORK C m  CHARTER ch. XIX A, tit. I, Q 1339 (Thomson 1901). 
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though designated a "Children's Court," the phrase was mislead- 
ing. Jurisdiction continued to be vested in the magistrate's court, 
which was a criminal tribunal. Delinquency cases were merely 
transferred to a separate part of the court "held by the several 
magistrates in r o t a t i ~ n . " ~ ~  The amendment applied to children 
"under sixteen years of age"22 and substantive provisions dating 
from 1824 were applied. In short, the "Children's Court" continued 
the practices that had developed over the past seventy-five years. 
The only "reform" was the physical segregation of certain delin- 
quency cases (and other matters involving children) within the 
adult criminal system. By 1910, all of New York City and several 
upstate urban centers, including Buffalo, had organized children's 
court parts.23 
At the end of that decade, the legislature also enacted a series 
of comprehensive measures governing delinquency. These statutes 
were of far greater significance than the earlier establishment of the 
children's court parts. Many of the concepts and procedures that 
are taken for granted today date back to 1909. For example, the Act 
stipulated that a "child of more than seven and less than sixteen 
years of age, who shall commit any act or omission which, if 
committed by an adult, would be a crime not punishable by death 
or life imprisonment, shall not be deemed guilty of any crime, but 
of juvenile delinquency only."24 
The 1909 reform act also continued an earlier penal law provi- 
sion, apparently dating back to the first years of the twentieth 
century. It  stated that "the commission by a child under the age of 
sixteen years, of a crime, not capital or punishable by life imprison- 
ment, which if committed by an adult would be a felony, renders 
such child guilty of a misdemeanor only."25 In lieu of imprison- 
ment, the child could be placed with a person or a suitable institu- 
tion "until majority or for a shorter term."2e However, if commit- 
ment was to a state reformatory "the court imposing such sentence 
shall not fix or limit the duration thereof," apparently creating the 
first provision permitting placement for an indeterminate 
In short, the 1909 reforms fully decriminalized delinquency by 
converting the former discretionary power of the court into a re- 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. See 1909 N.Y. Laws, chs. 570, 659. 
2A. Id. ch. 570, 5 92. The 1909 Act directed the court to "consider the child not as upon 
trial for commission of a crime, but as a child in need of care and protection of the state." Id. 
See also id. ch. 88, 5 2186, as amended by id. ch. 478. 
25. Id. ch. 478, 5 2186. 
26. N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 2194 (McKinney 1909) (amended 1949, 1950, 1956, 1962). 
27. Id. 0 2195. 
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quirement of individualized and separate treatment based upon the 
needs of the child. Criminal punishment was precluded. The age 
limit remained constant at sixteen and, as a practical matter, only 
the crimes of first- and second-degree murder were excepted.28 
The reform act, however, did not alter procedure or signifi- 
cantly affect jurisdiction, though New York City delinquency juris- 
diction was transferred from the magistrate's to the Court of Spe- 
cial Sessions, which customarily heard adult misdemeanor cases.20 
Outside of New York City, except for those few counties that had 
organized children's parts,30 the adult criminal courts were charged 
with the responsibility of applying the new law. 
The continuation of adult jurisdiction coupled with the spe- 
cialized treatment of children was apparently not successful, for in 
1922 and 1924 the legislature finally established independent chil- 
dren's The new courts' organization was remarkably sim- 
ilar to the present family court, although the substantive proce- 
dures adopted in 1909 remained unchanged.32 Therefore, until the 
early 1920 '~~  New York did not have a juvenile court, despite the 
earlier misleading description of criminal court parts as "children's 
court." As noted earlier however, the absence of separate courts did 
not mean that children were treated as criminals. Criminal punish- 
ment had been only one option since 1824, and the practice was 
prohibited by 1909. The special juvenile procedures that had 
evolved since 1824, however, had been applied by the adult crimi- 
nal courts. In a sense, the juvenile court was a product of the long 
28. Id. 8 1045. Death was a penalty for first-degree murder or treason against New York 
State, id. 8 2382, a crime that could hardly be committed by a chiid under the age of 16. Life 
imprisonment could be imposed only for second-degree murder or for a fourth felony 
conviction. The latter was impossible since a child could not legally commit a felony other 
than murder. 1909 N.Y. Laws, ch. 478, § 2186. 
Laws, ch. 478, 8 2186. 
29. 1909 N.Y. Lawvs, ch. 470, § 102. There were nevertheless attempts to segregate the 
children's part; for example, one section provided that "[slo far as is consistent with proper 
administration, certain of the probation officers shall be permanently assigned by a majority 
of the judges to the children's court." Id. 
30. Id. ch. 487. 
31. 1922 N.Y. Lawvs, ch. 547. The 1922 Act applied outside Newv York City, and the 1924 
Act established a separate Children's Court in Newv York City. 1924 N.Y. Laws, ch. 254. 
There were, however, provisions for criminal judges to preside in Children's Court in thosc 
counties too small to warrant a separate court. 1922 N.Y. Laws, ch. 547, 1 4. 
32. 1924 N.Y. Laws, ch. 259. For reasons that are not apparent, the New York City 
Children's Court was short-lived, and in 1933 the New York City Domestic Relations Court 
was organized. 1933 N.Y. Lawvs, ch. 482. The Domestic Relations Court remained in 
existence until it was merged with the present family court. 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 689, §§ 
41-43. The children's courts throughout the rest of the state, however, continued until the 
establishment of the family courts. See Besharov, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. FAM. CT. 
Acr 8 1.12 (McKinney 1975). 
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history of the separate and relatively lenient treatment of children. 
Given the fact that children were already treated separately, a 
logical progression was the establishment of independent children's 
The substance of the delinquency laws remained virtually un- 
changed through the decades. From 1824 until the early part of the 
twentieth century, a child under sixteen could be sentenced crimi- 
nally or could be placed as a delinquent in lieu of criminal sentenc- 
ing. Although the criminal option was repealed (except for mur- 
der), the delinquency disposition alternative remained relatively 
constant. Thus, a child could be placed as a delinquent until the 
age of twenty-one. Although the present eighteen-month placement 
limit was not prescribed, there were provisions for early release and 
rehearing. 
Since the children's part remained an integral part of the 
criminal court system, the entire panoply of criminal procedure, 
including the possibility of jury trial and criminal standards of 
proof, were fully applicable to delinquency cases.34 Indeed, for 
many years, the option of delinquency placement in lieu of criminal 
sentencing did not arise until a conviction had been obtained. 
Given the criminal milieu and the possibility of criminal sanctions, 
the application of due process standards was taken for granted. The 
Children's Court Act, for example, provided for the possibility of a 
jury trial.35 As late as 1927, the New York Court of Appeals held 
that criminal procedure standards were required in delinquency 
actions.36 In 1931, it was held that proof of delinquency must be 
established beyond a reasonable 
New York State's strict adherence to criminal due process 
standards was relaxed during the 1 9 3 0 ' ~ ~  largely as a result of the 
social work juvenile court model, which had by then been adopted 
on a national basis. In 1932, a sharply divided New York Court of 
Appeals held that the constitutional protection against self-incrimi- 
nation no longer applied to juvenile delinquency actions.38 Citing 
33.' The progression for separate treatment to separate courts should be contrasted with 
the currently held perception that separate treatment resulted solely from the establishment 
of the juvenile courts. See S. DAVIS, RIGHTS OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
$5 1.1-.3 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as DAVIS]. 
34. People v. Fikgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927). 
35. "[Tlhe court may hear and determine such causes in which it has jurisdiction with or 
without a jury, in the discretion of the court." 1924 N.Y. Laws, ch. 436, 5 14. Ironically, the 
United States Supreme Court, some 50 years later, concluded that a jury trial would, if 
"superimposed upon the juvenile system," obviate the need for its continued existence. 
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971). 
36. See People v. Fikgerald, 244 N.Y. 307, 155 N.E. 584 (1927). 
37. In re Madik, 233 A.D. 12, 251 N.Y.S. 765 (1st Dep't 1931). 
38. People v. Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171, 183 N.E. 353 (1932). 
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the distinctions between criminal and delinquency proceedings, the 
court in People v. Lewis, held that the less rigorous civil notice and 
evidentiary standards were sufficient, including the civil rule that 
the charges be proven only by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The court maintained: 
The fundamental point is that the proceeding was not a 
criminal one. The state was not seeking to punish a male- 
factor. It was seeking to salvage a boy who was in danger 
of becoming one. . . . Since the proceeding was not a 
criminal one, there was neither right to nor necessity for 
the procedural safeguards prescribed by constitution and 
statute in criminal cases.39 
People u. Lewis marked the end of the era in which criminal 
procedural standards were applied to delinquency cases and the 
beginning of the more informal "parens patriae" system. 40 
Substantive delinquency law remained largely unchanged 
from 1922, the year the Children's Court Act was enacted, until 
1962, the year of the enactment of the present Family Court Act. 
The organization of the court remained constant, and the informal 
standards approved in Lewis were applied. 
In 1956, the exception for crimes punishable by death or life 
imprisonment, however, was limited to children more than fifteen 
years of age.41 Raising the age of criminal responsibility for mur- 
der appears to have been a compromise developed as the result of 
considerable pressure to eliminate even the limited exception as 
inconsistent with the strong public policy favoring the separate and 
more benign treatment of children. In 1946, for example, a district 
attorney who had prosecuted a fourteen year old for murder com- 
mented: 
[Tlhe job of getting the legislature to move in that direc- 
tion [elimination of the capital offense exception] should 
39. Id. at 177, 183 N.E. at 355. A strong dissent was written by Judge Crane, who had 
drafted the earlier Fitzgerald decision. Id. at 179, 183 N.E. at 356 (Crane, J., dissenting). 
40. After an absence of only one generation, however, the 1962 Family Court Act 
reinstated several due process procedures. 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 
(1967), and subsequent federal and state rulings later completed the circle by applying most 
of the criminal procedure standards to delinquency actions. In the interim, several new due 
process criminal standards, such as the exclusionary rule, had been added to criminal 
procedure. See, e.g., U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 
471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The juvenile got back a good deal more than 
he had surrendered earlier. 
41. 1956 N.Y. Laws, ch. 919. 
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now be undertaken and assumed, in part at any rate, by 
those who have been horrified at the sight of the people of 
the state of New York proceeding against a 14 year old boy 
in a criminal 
The move apparently reflected a growing consensus that the juve- 
nile court system should be strengthened and expanded, as it had 
been in several other states with higher age limits and greater 
judicial discretionary authority to protect even the most violent 
youthful offender.43 
In view of this trend, a 1960 statute enacted by the New York 
State Legislature is surprising, in that it permitted the family court 
to commit to the Elmira Prison (designated as the correctional 
facility for adult offenders under the age of 21) fifteen-year-old 
offenders who were found to have committed first-degree assault, 
burglary, manslaughter, rape, robbery, sodomy, kidnapping or 
murder.44 The statute can best be described as a close forerunner 
of the Juvenile Offender Act of 1978. With the significant exception 
that such cases remained in the juvenile courts, the list of crimes is 
virtually identical to the Juvenile Offender Law. In approving the 
legislation, Governor Rockefeller noted that the new statute "will 
result in separating hardened delinquents from the less serious juve- 
nile offenders without removing the protections for youth afforded 
by a proceeding conducted in the children's court or domestic 
relations court."45 
The present Family Court Act was adopted in 1962. In con- 
sidering the proposed Act, the legislature maintained exclusive orig- 
inal jurisdiction over crimes committed by youngsters under the age 
of sixteen, while rejecting proposals to expand delinquency jurisdic- 
tion to age eighteen.4e The delinquency procedure and disposition 
provisions of the Children's Court Act remained largely un- 
amended. 
During the 1970's increasing juvenile crime and the public 
perception that the delinquency penalties were overly lenient re- 
sulted in increased pressure for tougher punishments. After several 
42. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1946, at 29, col. 4, quoted in TAPPAN, supra note 2, at 174. 
43. See notes 55. 70 infra. 
44. 1960 N.Y. &, ch. 882. 
45. Id. ch. 2051. The 1960 ~rovision was recodified in 1962 and amended to include 
every Class A and Class B felony.-~.y. FAM. CT. Am $758 (McKinney 1975). The amended 
section remained in effect until it was replaced by the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976, 
1976 N.Y. Laws, ch. 878,$ 2 (current version at N.Y. FAM. CT. Am $ 254 (McKinney Supp. 
1976-1980)). 
46. JOINT LEGISLATIVE C O M M ~ E E  ON COURT REORGANIZATION, STATE OF NEW YORK, 
YOUNG OFFENDERS AND COURT REORGANIZATION 1-3 (1963). 
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unsuccessful attempts to enact more stringent provisions, the legis- 
lature successively adopted the 1976 Juvenile Justice Reform 
and the 1978 Juvenile Offender 
The 1976 Act established a new category of delinquency, the 
"designated felony,"49 which was limited to violent crimes, such as 
homicide and first-degree robbery. Children above the age of four- 
teen who were found to have committed designated felonies could 
be placed for periods of three to five years (as opposed to the 
"normal" eighteen-month placement) with a minimum period of 
up to eighteen months in secure c~nf inement .~~  Prosecution was 
strengthened by granting the district attorney the optional power of 
presenting such cases before the family court.51 Perhaps most sig- 
nificantly, the court was directed to consider "the need for protec- 
tion of the community," a provision that constitutes a sharp philo- 
sophical change from the concept of individual juvenile justiceqG2 
The Reform Act remains in effect, and has been expanded to in- 
clude every juvenile offense as well as nonjuvenile felonies involving 
repeat offenders. 
Although in some ways similar to the 1978 Juvenile Offender 
Act, the 1976 measure retained and augmented the family court's 
historic authority in dealing with violent youth. The juvenile proce- 
dural safeguards of privacy, confidentiality, and individualized dis- 
position remained. While the available sanctions were strength- 
ened, they remained well below the punitive measures available to 
a criminal court. Viewed historically, the Act represented a return 
to the greater authority traditionally vested in the juvenile courts. 
The 1976 Act was quickly followed by the 1978 Juvenile Of- 
fender Act. The 1978 Act lowered the age of criminal responsibility 
from sixteen to fourteen for a wide range of crimes, including first- 
and second-degree robbery and burglary, first-degree assault and 
first-degree rape, arson and kidnapping. The age of criminal re- 
sponsibility for murder was reduced to thirteen.S3 Age reduction 
automatically precluded family court jurisdiction and thereby sub- 
jected youths to prosecution in the adult criminal courts. Therefore, 
the substantive body of adult criminal law is now, with several 
notable exceptions, applied to children below the age of sixteen. 
47. 1976 N.Y. Lawvs, ch. 878. 
48. 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 478. 
49. 1976 N.Y. Lawvs, ch. 878, $ 712(h). 
50. N.Y. FAM. CT. Am $ 753-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-1980). 
51. Id. $254-a. The county attorney or corporation counsel and the county executive or 
mayor (of New York City) must agree to district attorney prosecution. Id. 
52. Id. 5 711. 
53. 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 478, $ 2. 
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For the first time since 1824, the discretionary power of the 
court to waive a criminal penalty regardless of the circumstances of 
the case has been abolished. A youth arrested for the alleged com- 
mission of a juvenile offense is subjected to adult procedures includ- 
ing bail, indictment, and public hearings.S4 There are, however, 
provisions for "removal" or transfer to the family court, and the 
penalties available upon conviction are less than those that may be 
imposed upon an 
The Juvenile Offender Act represents an important historical 
break in the juvenile court movement or, more broadly, the move- 
ment to treat children separately. As noted earlier, the juvenile 
justice system itself was not, as commonly assumed, born full- 
blown in the early years of the twentieth century. It was the result 
of an evolutionary development that began almost simultaneously 
with the establishment of the prison system. Thus, New York's one 
hundred and fifty year history of maintaining an age threshold of 
sixteen for criminal prosecution (except for murder cases) has been 
terminated by the Juvenile Offender Act. 
By applying criminal sanctions, the Juvenile Offender Act 
adopts an approach which was explicitly rejected as recently as 
1960, when the juvenile courts' dispositional powers were strength- 
ened, and again rejected, at least implicitly, in 1976 when the 
Juvenile Justice Reform Act was enacted. The incarceration of 
youths in adult prisons (when the "placed" youth reaches the age of 
eighteen) for criminal activities committed under the age of sixteen, 
a measure which is permitted without hearing under the Juvenile 
Offender Act, was attacked successfully at the inception of the 
prison system in 1824 and gradually abolished by the end of that 
century. Finally, the assumption that the juvenile or family courts 
cannot cope with the violent youth, implicit in the Juvenile Of- 
fender Act, is historically unfounded. The juvenile courts and juve- 
nile parts of the criminal courts have possessed ample authority to 
deal with the most violent juvenile offender for well over a century. 
The lack of historical precedent does not in itself prove that the 
Juvenile Offender Act should be repealed or modified. It is, how- 
ever, an indication of the need for analysis of the Act in light of the 
collective experience of the past one hundred and fifty years. In 
addition, the comparative experience of other 'states should be stud- 
ied prior to examining New York's experience in implementing the 
Act's provisions. 
54. See N.Y. PENAL LAW $30.00 (McKinney Supp. 1980). 
55. Id. $ 60.10. 
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11. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
The New York Juvenile Offender Act includes several provi- 
sions never enacted in any other state.5e For example, no jurisdic- 
tion, other than New York, permits an adult criminal charge to be 
lodged against a person less than sixteen years of age without at 
least an initial determination by the juvenile court. For this age 
group, no other jurisdiction applies adult criminal procedures to 
the early critical stages of arrest, arraignment, criminal complaint, 
and bail procedures.S7 Only New York vests the prosecution with 
the sole authority, in most cases, of deciding whether a youth 
should be criminally p r o s e c ~ t e d . ~ ~  
Just a handful of states have established an age limitation as 
low as sixteen for the juvenile court. Most states have provided 
strong prosecution services to the juvenile courts. Lastly, almost 
every state provides for the limited transfer of very serious cases 
involving older youths from the juvenile court to the adult system, a 
procedure that the New York Juvenile Offender Act reverses. 
A. Age Jurisdiction 
Approximately two-thirds of the states have established a ma..- 
imum age limit of eighteen or higher for de l inq~ency .~~  Approxi- 
mately ten additional states have established an age limitation of 
s e ~ e n t e e n . ~ ~  Only Connecticut, North Carolina, Vermont and 
New York have maintained a jurisdictional age limit of 
New York is, therefore, one of a small number of states that rou- 
56. The District of Columbia is perhaps the closest analogy. However, the D.C. equiva- 
lent of the Juvenile Offender Act is applicable only to children above the age of 16 (and less 
than 18) and does not incorporate removal provisions. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2301(3) (1973 & 
Supp. IV 1977); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 
U.S. 909 (1973). A few states permit the direct filing of adult criminal charges for extremely 
serious crimes committed by youngsters over the age of 16. See, e.g., MD. CTS. B JUD. Pnoc. 
CODE ANN. 8 3-804(d)(4) (1980), which grants the criminal courts original jurisdiction when 
a child over the age of 16 is accused of committing the crime of robbery with a deadly 
weapon. 
57. Transfer powers, which most states apply, are invoked at later stages and usually 
after juvenile court screening. See note 70 infm. 
58. See text accompanying notes 64-77 in*. 
59. See S. Fox, JUVENILE COURTS IN A NUTSHELL 32, Appendix B (2d ed. 1977). A clear 
majority of states have opted for an 18 year limit, while a few have established jurisdictional 
limits of 19. Hence, the juvenile courts possess original delinquency jurisdiction for crimes 
committed by persons under 18 years of age, subject, in most states, to limited powers of 
transfer to the adult criminal system. Id. 
60. See DAVIS, supra note 33, Appendix B. 
61. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-301 (Supp. 1980) (originally codified as CONN. GEN. 
STAT. 5 17-53). 
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tinely subject sixteen- and seventeen-year-old persons to adult crim- 
inal prosecution. 
It should be noted that arrest rates rise exponentially with age. 
The number of arrests involving sixteen and seventeen year old 
persons is substantially greater than arrests involving younger ado- 
lescents. If New York were to adopt the national standard of eigh- 
teen, the number of youths treated as delinquent (and spared crimi- 
nal prosecution) would increase greatly. For example, 9,256 
delinquency cases were filed in New York City in 1974, while in the 
same year, Los Angeles, which is less than one-half the size of New 
York but applies an age limitation of eighteen years, reported 
19,059 delinquency cases (for all crimes except traffic ~f fenses) .~~ 
Philadelphia, a city only a fraction of New York's size, reported 
10,664 cases.e3 As a consequence of New York's jurisdictional age 
restriction, this state has historically criminally prosecuted far more 
children, i.e., persons under the age of eighteen, than any other 
state. Needless to say, the heavy emphasis on adult criminal prose- 
cution of adolescents pre-dated enactment of the Juvenile Offender 
Act. 
As noted earlier, New York adopted the present age limitation 
in 1824, at the inception of the movement to treat juvenile of- 
fenders separately. The standard has remained constant through 
several major delinquency law revisions spanning a century and a 
half. This severe age restriction should nevertheless be considered in 
evaluating the Juvenile Offender Act. The safeguards that have 
traditionally and routinely been available to even older youngsters 
by almost every state except New York, together with transfer 
provisions designed to protect the community interest, may well 
represent a viable alternative to the present Act. 
Historically, juvenile cases have been prosecuted by civil au- 
thorities, frequently by a probation department or county attor- 
ney.04 In the past decade, however, civil officials have largely been 
supplanted by state criminal prosecutors such as district  attorney^.^^ 
In effect, there has been a merger of juvenile and adult prosecutors 
62. LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION NATIONAL CRIME JUSTICE INFORMA- 
TION AND STATISTICS ERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS 
574-79 (1976). 
63. Id. at 579. Pennsylvania also applies a delinquency age limit of 18. 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. 5 6302 (Purdon 1981 Pamphlet). 
64. Until recently New York was notable for the complete absence of prosecutorial 
authority. Frequently, the unfortunate result was that the judge turned prosecutor. 
65. See RUBIN, JUVENILE J U S T I ~ ,  POLICY PRACTICE AND LAW 170-90 (1979). 
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with criminal officials assuming the responsibility of initiating and 
conducting juvenile proceedings. Every other major state has 
granted the criminal prosecutor exclusive powers in the juvenile 
The era of civil prosecution has ended, replaced by the 
presumably more effective approach of district or state attorney 
prosec~t ion.~~ 
The constitutional mandate to appoint defense counsel and the 
increasing legal formalism associated with juvenile delinquency 
cases have undoubtedly contributed to the prosecutorial trend. The 
public prosecutor may also be viewed as more effective (if not 
ruthless) in protecting the public interest. In addition, the very 
concept of prosecution is alien to and may conflict with the major 
responsibilities of probation or civil legal authorities. 
The factors which have resulted in stronger prosecution have 
nevertheless not affected juvenile court jurisdiction nationally. The 
jurisdictional age, transfer  provision^,^^ and dispositional alterna- 
tives have been largely unchanged. Juvenile courts have not been 
restructured. In a sense, the national reaction has been to 
strengthen juvenile prosecution while retaining the protection and 
individualized dispositional treatment afforded by the juvenile 
court. 
New York, by way of contrast, has through the Juvenile Of- 
fender Act decreased the jurisdiction of the family court, a court 
that already possessed less jurisdiction than its counterparts in most 
other states, while not materially strengthening juvenile prosecu- 
tion. To be sure, in 1976, district attorneys were granted condi- 
tional authority to prosecute designated felony cases, a provision 
that encompasses only the most serious crimes.eg However, even in 
those counties in which the district attorney has elected to prosecute 
such cases, the primary prosecutor remains civil in the form of the 
corporation counsel or county attorney. 
C.  Transfer Provisions 
Almost every state grants the juvenile courts exclusive original 
jurisdiction for cases involving children less than sixteen years of 
66. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, 701-21 (Smith Hurd 1974); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
42, § 6336 (Purdon 1979). 
67. The only exception other than New York is the District of Columbia, which still relies 
on corporation counsel prosecution. D.C. CODE ANN. § 2305(a) (1973). 
68. A few states have, however, facilitated the transfer of violent cases to the adult 
criminal courts. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. 260.15 (1980). 
69. N.Y. FAM. CT. Am 8 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1976-1980). District Attorney prosecu- 
tion is possible only through voluntary agreement between the district attorney and the 
mayor. 
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age, but provides for the possible transfer of serious cases to the 
adult criminal system.70 Every case in which a youth is charged 
with a crime must originate in the juvenile court. After a formal 
court hearing and subject to defined transfer criteria, the case may 
be fonvarded to an adult criminal court.71 
The specific standards determining transfer vary, although 
usually several preconditions must be proven. First, the child must 
be of a minimum "transfer" age, commonly fourteen or fifteen.72 
Second, the crime alleged must be a felony or, in some states, a 
violent felony offense.73 Finally, the juvenile court judge must 
determine, after an evidentiary hearing, that adult criminal sanc- 
tions are app r~pr i a t e .~~  In most states, it is incumbent upon the 
prosecutor to request a transfer. Occasionally, the child may have a 
right to demand that he be heard in a criminal court, thereby 
obtaining a jury trial and other procedural benefits. 
A few states have also enacted mandatory transfer provisions. 
For example, in Pennsylvania a murder charge must be transferred 
from the juvenile courts (assuming the child is of the requisite 
minimum age).75 Connecticut mandates transfer when a child of 
the requisite age is accused of committing a class A or a class B 
felony and there has been a previous adjudication for a similar 
crime.76 Florida has enacted an unusual provision that requires 
the prosecutor to request transfer when the child is accused of 
committing a second "violent77 crime against a person.77 However, 
the juvenile court may deny his request. 
Although the procedures and standards vary among jurisdic- 
tions, the underlying principle encompasses the transfer of very 
serious cases involving older youths to the adult system.78 Signifi- 
cantly, the initial determination is made by the juvenile court 
70. Transfer powers generally extend only to the older adolescent, typically 15- and 
16-year-old youths. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4-48(a) (West 1978); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. 8 2151-36(1) (Page 1978). 
71. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4-48 (West 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 8 2151-36 
(Page 1978). 
72. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4-48 (West 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 8 2151-26 
(Anderson Supp. 1980). 
73. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:4-48(b) (West 1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151- 
36(A) (Page 1978). 
74. E.g., Delinquent 6 Dependent Children, 27 CAL. JUR. 3d, $8 67-71 (1976); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, 8 54.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980-1981). 
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 8 6355 (Purdon 1979). 
76. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 8 46b-126 (Supp. 1980). 
. - -  
77. FLA. STAT. 39.09 (1979). 
78. It  should be noted that, unlike youths governed by the Juvenile Offender Act provi- 
sions in most states, a youth transferred to a criminal court faces the possibility of a full adult 
criminal sanction. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. fj 7A-611 (1979). 
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judge. The child thereby receives the protection and confidentiality 
of the juvenile system until the need for adult prosecution is proven. 
Arrest, detention and preliminary procedures are also consistent 
with those applied to all juveniles. Even in jurisdictions that pro- 
vide for limited mandatory transfers, the commencement of the 
action must be in the juvenile court, thus granting the court and 
prosecutor the opportunity to determine whether transfer is war- 
ranted.7g If the case involves overcharging or lacks probable cause, 
the child remains in the juvenile court, thus precluding possible 
damage resulting from an adult criminal charge. 
New York's provision requiring the initial filing in the adult 
criminal court followed by possible "removal" or transfer of a case 
to the family court reverses the practice found in every other state. 
The Juvenile Offender Act thereby fails to protect those children 
who are erroneously charged or who will, in any event, be trans- 
ferred to the family court. Initiating criminal prosecutions, only to 
have most cases "removed" to the family court is, in many ways, 
tantamount to closing the barn door after the horse has escaped. 
Protection and confidential treatment are most needed at the com- 
mencement of the action when decisions should be made without 
public pressure and the rigors of automatic criminal p rosecu t i~n .~~  
The unique New York delinquency provisions, when com- 
bined, have cumulative adverse effects. The severe age restriction, 
alone, automatically places a greater number of cases in the adult 
system. The Juvenile Offender Act further increases the volume of 
adult prosecutions by severely limiting family court jurisdiction. 
The need for stronger prosecution in the family court has also 
inhibited the development of an acceptable alternative to criminal 
prosecution. Lastly, vesting the adult courts with transfer powers, 
instead of commencing all cases in the juvenile system, has ad- 
versely affected the large majority of youths whose cases are ulti- 
mately (as in every state) decided by the family court. b 
It should again be emphasized that, even prior to the enact- 
ment of the Juvenile Offender Act, New York possessed perhaps the 
harshest juvenile laws in the country. As noted by one commenta- 
tor: 
Indeed, looking only at Juvenile Court can provide a mis- 
leading picture of what happens to juvenile offenders. For 
79. See, e.g., GAL. WELF. bi INS. CODE 5 707 (West 1981). In Pennsylvania, a murder 
case which is erroneously commenced in the adult criminal court need not be transferred 
back to the juvenile court. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, 5 6355 (Purdon 1978). 
80. Approximately nine out of every ten cases filed under the Juvenile Offender Act are 
in fact removed to the family court or dismissed. See text accompanying notes 96-99 infra. 
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all its apparent leniency, New York has the toughest juve- 
nile sentencing policy of any state in the union: it incarcer- 
ates comparatively few youngsters in juvenile facilities, 
but it jails large numbers of 16- and 17-year olds. Relative 
to its total juvenile population, the state's combined jail 
and detention rate in 1971 was half again as high as Cali- 
fornia's and four to one and one half times the rate in 
Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. Some of the differences 
undoubtly reflected the higher rate of robbery by younger 
offenders in New York than elsewhere; most of it is testi- 
mony to the freer use of punishment by the adult system.81 
This section evaluates the implementation and experience of 
the Juvenile Offender Act from the effective date, September 1, 
1978, through late 1979; including a brief up-date covering the 
period through February 1980. The analysis will, with minor ex- 
ceptions, be based on official published reports. It is not my inten- 
tion to incorporate every published statistic, but rather to present 
relevant statistical information in a meaningful sequence and to 
evaluate the Act's effectiveness and impact. Conclusions and rec- 
ommendations are incorporated in subsequent sections. 
The two major available statistical sources are the New York 
State Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS) and the New 
York City Criminal Justice Agency. A major report published by 
the Division of Criminal Justices2 incorporates statistical informa- 
tion reflecting the Act's implementation during the first year after 
enactment.s3 A second major report incorporating information for 
a nine-month period (September 1978 through May 1979) has been 
issued jointly by the New York City Criminal Justice Agency and 
the D i v i s i ~ n . ~ ~  Since only twenty-four juvenile offenders were sen- 
tenced in the Supreme Court during the first year and hence in- 
cluded in the Division Report,s5 this writer has also obtained unoffi- 
81. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 354 (1978). 
82. N.Y.S. DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, SEMI-ANNUAL VIOLENT FELONYIJUVE- 
NILE OFFENSES PROCESSING AND DISPOSITION REPORT, SEPT. 1, 1978-Auc. 31, 1979 (dated Oct. 
1, 1979, released Dec. 1979) [hereinafter cited as DCJS REPORT]. 
83. The Division report is largely limited to New York City, though it incorporates 
sketchy information from counties outside of New York City. Id. at i-ii. 
84. Nnv YORK CITY CNMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY dr N.Y.S. DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SERVICES, JUVENILE OFFENDERS IN NEW YORK CITY: THEIR CHARACTENSTICS AND THE COURSE OF 
CASE PROCESSING ( ov. 1979) [hereinafter cited as CJA REPORT]. This report utilizes statistics 
collected from September 1, 1978 to May 31, 1979. Id. at 1. 
85. See DCJS REPORT, supra note 82, Appendix, Table 72. 
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cial sentencing information from New York, Bronx and Kings 
counties covering the period from September through December, 
1979, bringing the total to a more statistically meaningful level of 
seventy-nine.s6 Queens and Richmond statistics were not available. 
A. Arrests 
During the first year (September 1978 through August 1979), 
1,689 juvenile offender arrests were reported statewide (Table 
A).87 Of the total, 1,455 or eighty-six percent occurred in New 
TABLE A 
SUBURBAN UPSTATE N.Y.C. STATEWIDE 
ROBBERY 1" 43 ( 36) 40 ( 35) 654 ( 45) 737 ( 44) 
ROBBERY 2" 23 ( 19) 29 ( 25) 453 ( 31) 505 ( 30) 
ASSAULT lo 5 (  4) 5 (  4) 58 ( 4) 68 ( 4) 
BURGLARY 1" 6 (  5) 1 (  1) 20 ( 1) 27 ( 2) 
BURGLARY 2" 13 ( 11) 9 (  8) 16 ( 1) 38 ( 2) 
ARSON lo & 2" 7 (  6) 6 (  5) 29 ( 2) 42 ( 2) 
RAPE 1" 14 ( 12) 10 ( 9) 8 9 (  6) 113( 7) 
SODOMY lo 2 (  2) 7 0 )  34 ( 2) 43 ( 3) 
KIDNAP lo 1 (  1) 3 (  0) 4 (  0) 
ATT. MUR. 2" 2 (  2) 1 (  1) 43 ( 3) 46 ( 3) 
MURDER 2" 3 ( 3)* 5 (  4) 25 ( 2) 33 ( 2) 
OTHER 2 (  2) 4 (  0) 6 (  0) 
UNKNOWN 27 ( 2) 27 ( 2) 
120 (100) 114 (100) 1455 (100) 1689 (100) 
( 7) ( 7) ( 86) (100) 
* Includes one manslaughter 1" arrest. 
Note: Numbers in  parentheses are  percentages. 
86. It should also be noted that, although most events, such as removal to the family 
court, have been subdivided by crime, some have not (i.e., the number of cases that the 
grand jury refused to indict). Thus, when discussing specific crimes a particular variable may 
be approximated, based on the reported statistics covering all juvenile offenders (and will be 
denoted as such). For example, the grand jury failed to indict 12% of the defendants whose 
cases were presented. The writer has thus assumed that the grand jury failed to indict 12% of 
presented robbery cases, although the exact figure may be somewhat higher or lower for the 
specific crime of robbery. 
87. See Table A. 
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York City, while only 234 or fourteen percent occurred throughout 
the rest of the state. 
The relatively small number of arrests outside of New York 
City is surprising. Approximately forty percent of all juvenile ar- 
rests occur outside the Although the percentage of juvenile 
offenses which by definition involve serious violent crimes, may 
well be higher in the state's large urban areas, the disparity (forty 
percent of the total delinquency caseload versus fourteen percent of 
juvenile offenses) appears to be grossly disproportionate. Absent 
statistical error, the available data nevertheless indicates that in 
upstate areas violent juvenile criminal activity is comparatively 
minimal and, conversely, nonviolent criminal conduct constitutes a 
substantially higher portion of the caseload. 
Of the 1,689 recorded arrests, 1,242 or seventy-four percent 
were for the crimes of first- and second-degree robbery. Thus rob- 
bery accounted for fully three of each four juvenile offender crimes. 
The next most prevalent crime was rape, accounting for 113 or 
seven percent of the total. The remaining categories account for 
only minimal percentages of the caseload, ranging from four per- 
cent (assault) to two percent (murder). Therefore the Juvenile Of- 
fender Act has been applied predominately to the crime of robbery. 
Other juvenile offenses included under the Act accounted for only 
447 statewide arrests. 
The most surprising arrest statistic pertains to burglary.89 Un- 
der the Act the crimes of first- and, partially, second-degree bur- 
glary constitute juvenile offenses.g0 Yet only sixty-five arrests, four 
percent of the total, involved the juvenile offense of burglary. In 
New York City only thirty-six youths (two percent of the city's 
juvenile offense arrests) were charged with the crime during the 
entire year. 
Burglary, however, is an extremely prevalent offense. During 
the first nine months of 1979, a period corresponding to the imple- 
mentation of the Juvenile Offender Act, 2,402 burglary arrests 
involving fourteen- and fifteen-year-old youths were reported in 
New York City.g1 On an annual basis the number of burglary 
88. See N.Y.S. DMSION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, COMPREHENSIVE CRIME CONTROL 
PLAN, Table VIII, at VII-21 (1979). 
89. Burglary basically comprises the act of knowingly entering or remaining unlawfully 
in a building with the intent of committing a crime therein. See N.Y. PENAL AW $5 140.20, 
.25 (McKinney 1975). 
90. The Juvenile Offender Act includes subdivision one of second-degree burglary, id. 5 
140.25, which consists of burglary involving the use or the threat of use of a dangerous 
instrument, the possession of arms, or burglary which results in any physical injury. 
91. New York City Police Department unpublished data collected from January 1, 1979 
to September 30, 1979. 
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arrests involving fourteen- and fifteen-year-old persons was approx- 
imately 3,200. Incredibly only thirty-six of 3,200 arrests (one per- 
cent) involved first- or second-degree burglary while over 3,100 
arrests involved third-degree burglary (ninety-nine percent) .02 
First- and second-degree charges should constitute a far higher 
percentage. 
The most plausible explanation is that the police have virtually 
ceased charging youths with first- or second-degree burglary, per- 
haps substituting third-degree burglary, attempted burglary or 
breaking and entering charges. The fact that burglary is the only 
nonviolent crime that the legislature included & a juvenile offense 
may explain this development. 
The lack of burglary arrests is a strong indication that the Act 
is overbroad. As will be shown, the vast majority of the youths 
accused of committing the less serious juvenile offenses are transfer- 
red to the family court. The police may be shortcutting the system 
to avoid lengthy criminal procedures such as booking and arraign- 
ment or may view burglary as an insufficiently serious crime to 
justify the application of adult criminal procedures. Ironically, if 
not for the Juvenile Offender Act, a youth could have been charged 
with the designated felony of burglary and subjected to a restrictive 
placement. If instead, the youth is charged with a nondesignated 
felony crime, the charge could, at most, result in an indeterminate 
eighteen-month placement. 
B. Prosecuto~ial Discretion 
The Juvenile Offender Act places the district attorney in an 
important, indeed almost paramount, position in determining 
whether or not a child should be prosecuted and in which court 
(adult or juvenile) the case should be tried and sentenced. Under 
the terms of the Act, the prosecutor must decide initially whether 
the child should be released, prosecuted as an adult, or referred or 
removed to the family court for possible juvenile delinquency 
action. At later stages, the district attorney may preclude the re- 
moval of a case to the family court, even if the court would other- 
wise be willing to grant a transfer.03 
The question of prosecution versus release, the threshold issue 
facing a prosecutor, might appear to be similar whether the defend- 
ant is a child or an adult. However, when dealing with juvenile 
92. Burglary also accounted for approximately 2,500 cases, or 18% of all petitions filed 
in the family court in 1977. O m c ~  OF COURT ADMINISTRATION A NUAL REPORT, Table 80 
(1978). 
93. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(5)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1980). 
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offender cases, the issue is complicated by the possibility of family 
court action. If, for example, the district attorney concludes that 
there is insufficient evidence to justify a juvenile offender com- 
plaint, the matter may be referred to the corporation counsel to 
determine whether the evidence substantiates a lesser charge. Even 
if the evidence suggests that the arrest charge is questionable, the 
district attorney may prefer to file a juvenile offender complaint 
and subsequently move for removal to the family court. Unlike a 
declination to prosecute, a case removed to the family court re- 
mains under the control and responsibility of the district attorney, a 
factor that may weigh heavily in determining the initial charge. 
The presence of dual court jurisdiction (criminal court and 
family court) compounded by dual prosecutorial responsibility (dis- 
trict attorney and corporation counsel) accordingly results in a 
multitude of possibilities. The district attorney elects the relevant 
option by deciding whether to charge a juvenile offense and, if so, 
whether to remove the case to the family court. 
Consequently, it is difficult to evaluate the district attorney's 
position and to identify factors that may contribute to prosecutorial 
decisions. For example, one factor that may affect the decision of 
criminal versus family prosecution is the presence of multiple de- 
fendants of differing ages. If one defendant is fifteen years of age 
while a codefendant is sixteen, the district attorney may decide to 
keep the juvenile case in a criminal court, thereby avoiding the 
possibility of split prosecution and the certainty of two separate 
trials in different courts. 
The presence of this factor is strongly suggested by the fact that 
in the Bronx, twenty-one of thirty-four juvenile defendants (sixty- 
two percent) who were sentenced by the supreme court (September 
1978 through December 1979) had one or more adult codefendants. 
By way of contrast, only twenty percent of all family court juvenile 
delinquency robbery cases involve an adult codefendant.94 There 
is no plausible reason, other than prosecutorial convenience, to 
account for the wide disparity. Moreover, the fact that supreme 
court sentences were comparable to those ordered by the family 
courtg5 suggests that the administrative convenience of retaining 
criminal jurisdiction was the paramount factor, rather than the 
particular facts of each case. In other words, the decision to treat a 
94. THE VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, FAMILY COURT DISPOSITION STUDY 67 (1980). The 
VERA study found that 20% of all family court robbery cases involved an adult co-defendant 
and in an additional 33% the presence or absence of an adult co-defendant was not known 
(the probable range is 25-35%). Id. at 354. 
95. See text accompanying note 108 infra. 
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child as an adult for criminal purposes may be related to the 
presence or absence of codefendants rather than the statutorily 
enumerated criteria such as the seriousness of the offense, the his- 
tory, character and condition of the youth or, in the case of an 
armed felony, mitigating circumstance.g6 
The district attorney's discretion permeates subsequent juve- 
nile offender procedures. The prosecutor presents the case before 
the grand jury, must agree to a possible plea which could result in 
removal to the family court, and recommends a possible sentence. 
Each of these events is described in subsequent subsections. 
C .  Declination of P~osecution 
As noted previously, the initial decision, made solely by the 
district attorney, is whether to decline prosecution, and release the 
child or refer the case for possible family court action. In the first 
nine months (September 1978 through May 1979), the district at- 
torneys throughout New York City declined to prosecute seventeen 
percent of all arrests (193 of 1,124).97 However, the declination 
rate varied widely from county to county. In Staten Island the 
district attorney declined prosecution in only three percent of the 
cases, in Queens the rate was seven percent, in Manhattan the rate 
was twenty-eight percent, Brooklyn registered a twelve percent 
declination rate, and the Bronx District Attorney declined to prose- 
cute twenty-five percent of all juvenile offender arrestseg8 Thus, a 
juvenile arrested in Manhattan is four times as likely to be released 
or referred to the family court as his counterpart arrested in 
Queens. 
The citywide declination rate also varied substantially by 
crime. Generally, however, the more serious crimes registered the 
lowest rate. For example, only four percent of all murder arrests 
and nine percent of all rape arrests were not prosecuted criminally, 
while twenty percent of all second-degree robbery arrests were 
declined. gg 
The district attorneys in most counties thus appear to be using 
their discretion to decline prosecution depending upon the gravity 
of the offense. However, the extremely low declination rates in 
Queens and Staten Island suggest that the district attorneys in those 
counties are unwilling to evaluate carefully which cases are inap- 
propriate for adult criminal prosecution. 
96. See N.Y. CRIM. WC. LAW 5 210.43 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1980). 
97. See CJA REPORT, supra note 84, at 4. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 5. 
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D. C~iminal Court Action 
Unless declined by the district attorney, every juvenile of- 
fender case is filed (in New York City) in the criminal court where 
the youth is initially arraigned and bail or release status deter- 
mined. The criminal court may also conduct a hearing to determine 
whether the case should be dismissed or removed to the family 
court. If not removed or dismissed, the case proceeds to the grand 
jury for possible indictment and trial in the supreme court.loO 
Table B is a reprint of a report by the Division for Criminal Justice 
Services, but it incorporates an additional column, added by this 
author. 
As can be seen in Table B, forty-four percent of all cases were 
removed to the family court at preliminary stages and an additional 
thirteen percent were dismissed. When declinations of prosecution 
are added, a total of seventy-seven percent of all cases (950 of 
1,240) were removed from the criminal system in the very early 
stages. In other words, more than three out of four youths who are 
subjected to adult criminal prosecution never reach the indictment 
stage. 
The removal rate varies considerably from county to county, 
ranging from twenty-one percent in Queens to forty-eight percent 
in Brooklyn. (The Staten Island rate, though higher, is derived 
from a very small statistical base.) In light of the statutory power of 
the district attorney, it is probable that the disparity in removal 
rates is caused largely by prosecutorial differences, although judi- 
cial philosophies may be a contributing factor.lol Since the ability 
of the court to remove without the district attorney's consent is very 
limited, and judges are reluctant to dispose of cases without prose- 
cutorial approval, it appears that to a large extent, the fate of a 
youth is determined by the policies and attitudes of the local district 
attorney. 
The geographical dichotomy is further compounded by deter- 
minations concerning parole or bail. Citywide, forty-five percent of 
all juvenile offenders were ~aroled. while bail was set in half the 
, A 
cases and five percent were detained without bail.lo2 However, 
100. Outside New York City, the case would be filed in local criminal court and, if not 
dismissed or removed to the family court, would be transferred to the county court. See N.Y. 
FAM. CT. Am 5 117 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1980). 
101. District attorney policies are concentrated in one individual while the separate 
philosophies of the large number of judges in each county tend to statistically average out. 
More importantly, the district attorney must consent to the removal of an armed felony case, 
and a nonarmed offense cannot be removed after indictment without hi approval. N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW 5 180.75(6) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1980). 
102. See CJA REPORT, supra note 84, at 11. 
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TABLE B 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
COURT ACTION BY COUNTY 
PERCENTAGE 
OF CASES 
WHICH 
HAVE BEEN 
KINGS BRONX NEW YORK QUEENS RICHMOND CITYWIDE DETERMINED 
Declined to 
Prosecute 78 ( 14) 71 ( 23) 64 ( 20) 37 ( 15) l (  3) 251 ( 17) ( 20) 
Removed to 
Family Ct. 263 ( 48) 129 ( 43) 79 ( 25) 54 ( 21) 17 ( 52) 542 ( 37) ( 44) 
Dismissed 54 ( 10) 22 ( 7) 59 ( 19) 19 ( 7) 3 (  9) 157 ( 11) ( 13) 
Subtotal 395 ( 72) 222 ( 73) 202 ( 64) 110 ( 43) 21 ( 64) 950 ( 65) ( 77) 
Pend. in 
Crim. Ct. 38 ( 7) 13 ( 4) 29 ( 9) 41 ( 16) l (  3) 122 ( 8) 
Pend. in 
Grand Jury 12 ( 2) 8 (  3) 8 (  3) 28 ( 2) 
Indicted 96 ( 18) 67 ( 22) 53 ( 17) 63 ( 25) 11 ( 33) 290 ( 20) ( 23) 
Subtotal 146 ( 27) 80 ( 26) 90 ( 28) 112 ( 44) 12 ( 36) 440 ( 30) 
Unconfirmed 
arrest reports 6 (  1) 1 (  0) 25 ( 8) 32 ( 13) 6.4 ( 4) 
Total 547 (100) 303 (100) 317*(100) 254 (100) 33 (100) 1454 (100) 1240(100) 
* One juvenile died before any court action was taken. 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
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the parole rate varied from thirty-five percent in Queens to fifty-six 
percent in Manhattan. When coupled with the differing rates of 
dismissal, only twenty-six percent of those arrested in Manhattan 
were not released (either through dismissal or parole), while fifty- 
eight percent were not released in Queens. The citywide average is 
forty-one percent.lo3 Youths arrested in Queens are far more likely 
to remain in the adult system and are far more likely to be detained 
or face the difficult task of raising bail. 
Finally, it should be noted that the number of cases removed 
to the family court also depends, to a large extent, on the particular 
crime charged. During the first nine months, fifty-nine percent of 
second-degree robbery cases and seventy percent of burglary cases 
were removed by the criminal court.lo4 During the same period 
only nine percent of the murder cases were removed. The removal 
rates are thus consistent with the pattern of screening out most of 
the less serious offenses through either dismissal or removal to the 
family court. What remains are cases involving very serious crimes, 
cases in which a particular district attorney has established a strin- 
gent or "tough" policy, and at least to some extent, cases in which it 
is administratively advantageous for the prosecutor to proceed 
criminally. 
E. Grand Jury Actions 
Cases that are not dismissed or removed to the family court are 
transferred to the supreme court for presentation to the grand jury 
and possible indictment. The grand jury, after hearing evidence 
presented by the district attorney, may indict the youth, dismiss the 
case, or, by finding that a crime of lesser magnitude than a juvenile 
offense was committed, remove the case to the family court.lo5 
Experience from September 1, 1978 to May 31, 1979 indicates 
that seventy-nine percent of juvenile offender cases presented to the 
grand jury result in indictment, while twenty-one percent are dis- 
missed or removed.lo6 However, the probability of indictment 
varies considerably from county to county. In the Bronx, ninety-six 
percent of presented cases are indicted, while in Queens, only 
seventy-five percent of the cases are indicted. Perhaps more impor- 
tant, during the first nine months, grand juries in the Bronx and 
Manhattan failed to dismiss even a single case while in Queens the 
grand jury dismissed fourteen percent of all presented cases.lo7 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 19. 
105. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 3 190.71 (McKinney Supp. 1972-1980). 
106. See CJA REPORT, supra note 84, at 26. 
107. Id. 
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The pattern is one of an inverse correlation between the dis- 
trict attorney dismissal rate (through declination of prosecution) 
and grand jury dismissals. The Bronx maintained a high declination 
rate coupled with the lowest grand jury dismissal rate (zero). 
Queens, which registered a low district attorney dismissal rate 
experienced the highest grand jury dismissal rate.lo8 In effect, 
Queens' grand juries dismissed those cases that the prosecutor could 
have dismissed at an earlier stage. The grand jury constituted a 
"leveling" step in juvenile offense proceedings, although in Queens 
a disproportionate number of youths charged with the commission 
of juvenile offenses are indicted despite the relatively large number 
of grand jury dismissals.10g 
F.  Supreme Court Proceedings 
Approximately one in four juvenile offender cases reaches the 
supreme court, the adult criminal tribunal responsible for trying 
and sentencing juvenile offenders. The remainder of the cases have, 
by the trial stage, already been dismissed or removed to the family 
court. The supreme court may, nevertheless, dismiss cases or, with 
the consent of the district attorney, remove additional cases to the 
family court either before or after a conviction has been obtained, 
Table C110 indicates that slightly over one-half of the cases, 
fifty-four percent, resulted in conviction through trial or plea. The 
remainder, approximately forty-six percent, were dismissed, ac- 
quitted or removed to the family court by the supreme court. Thus, 
approximately twelve percent (fifty-four percent of twenty-three 
percent) of all children charged with juvenile offenses are convicted 
of these offenses. Conversely, by the time the case reaches an adult 
conviction stage, eighty-eight percent have been screened out for 
proceedings amounting to less than a juvenile offense (dismissal, 
acquittal, or removal to the family court). 
The "leveling" effect first evinced by the grand jury continued 
in the supreme court. For example, Table C indicates that the 
conviction rate was high in Bronx and New York counties, precisely 
108. Compare Table B with CJA REPORT, supra note 84, at 26. 
109. It  should be noted that a total of 54 indictments were returned in counties outside of 
New York City during the first year, compared with 234 arrests. See DCJS R m n ~ ,  strpra 
note 82, Table 75. The outcome of the remaining cases, including those which may still be 
pending, has not been reported. 
110. See Table C. This is a reprint of the Division of Criminal Justice Services Supreme 
Court disposition table. Since over one-half of the cases are still pending, an additional 
column has been added to indicate the disposition percentage of those cases reaching a 
critical stage. 
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TABLE C 
PERCENTAGE 
OF CASES 
WHICH 
HAVE BEEN 
KINGS BRONX NEW YORK QUEENS RICHMOND CITYWIDE DETERMINED 
Guilty 
By Trial 2 (  2) 1 (  1) 3 (  6) 2 (  3) 2 ( 18) 10 ( 3) ( 8) 
Guilty 
10 ( 16) 58 ( 20) s By Admission 14 ( 15) 22 ( 33) 9 ( 17) 3 ( 27) ( 46) Z 2
Total & 
Convictions 16 ( 17) 23 ( 34) 12 ( 23) 12 ( 19) 5 ( 45) 68 ( 23) ( 54) 0 
Crl Removed from 
46 ( 16) 2 Supreme Ct. 1 (  1) 11 ( 16) 7 ( 13) 27 ( 43) ( 36) g 
h 
2 
Acquitted 1 (  2) 1 (  0) ( 1) $ 
Y 
Dismissed 4 (  4) 1 (  1) 6 ( 10) l (  9) 12 ( 4) ( 9) 
Pend. in 
Supreme Ct. 75 ( 78) 32 ( 48) 34 ( 64) 17 ( 27) 5 ( 45) 163 ( 56) 
Total 
Indictments 96 (100) 67 (100) 53 (100) 63 (100) 11 (100) 290 (100) 127 (100) , o 
W 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages. 
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those counties that screen cases in their early stages. Queens and 
Brooklyn, which experienced a higher indictment rate, conse- 
quently registered a lower conviction rate. 
G. Supreme Court Sentencing 
As noted previously, only twelve percent of the youths arrested 
for the commission of a juvenile offense were convicted under the 
Act, during the first year, that is, twelve percent of all cases 
reached the sentencing stage. However, a case may also be removed 
to the family court after conviction. Under the terms of the Act the 
supreme court justice must remove the case if the conviction, 
through plea or trial, involves a nonjuvenile offender crime. Even if 
the conviction is for a juvenile offense, the court, with the consent 
of the district attorney, may remove the case if the judge deems it 
inappropriate to apply adult criminal sanctions. 11' 
Experience to date indicates that approximately two-thirds of 
the convicted youths are transferred to family court, forty-six of the 
sixty-eight cases involving adult convictions were removed during 
the first year.l12 When applied to the number of juvenile offense 
arrests, only approximately six percent of all juvenile arrests re- 
sulted in a sentence by the adult court (one-third of the twelve 
percent conviction rate), i.e., six of one hundred children arrested 
under the Act were actually sentenced pursuant to the Act's terms. 
The Juvenile Offender Act also grants the supreme court wide 
latitude in determining an appropriate sentence. If the case is not 
removed after conviction the court may grant youthful offender 
status.l13 In the absence of a decision to remove or grant youthful 
offender status (or if the youth is ineligible for youthful offender 
treatment) the court determines the length of incarceration based 
upon the crime of conviction. For example, a youth convicted of a 
Class C felony may receive a minimum sentence of imprisonment 
ranging from one to three years. (Class C offenses include second- 
degree robbery, second-degree burglary, or first-degree assault.) A 
111. See CRIM. PROC. LAW 3 220.10(5)(g)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1972-1980); id. 5 330.25 
(McKinney Supp. 1981). If a case is removed after conviction, the removal order is deemed 
the equivalent of a family court finding and the case is placed on the calendar for a 
dispositional hearing before a family court judge. Compare id. 5 220.10 (McKinney Supp. 
1972-1980) with id. 5 330.25 (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
112. See DCJS REPORT, supra note 82, Table 71. 
113. N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 60.10 (McKinney Supp. 1980). The Penal Law provision was 
effective July 5,1979. Prior to that date, youthful offender status was not available under the 
Juvenile Offender Act and a youth whose case was not removed to the family court faced a 
mandatory period of imprisonment. Id. 5 60.01 (McKinney 1975). 
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youth convicted of second-degree murder may be sentenced to a 
maximum of nine years to life imprisonment.l14 
Sentences imposed by the adult courts range from probation 
(as part of a youthful offender sentence) to lengthy imprisonment. 
In fact, a major portion of the small number of youths who are 
sentenced in the adult system receive probation or short sentences. 
Suprisingly, a youth sentenced in the adult court may be treated 
more leniently than in the family court. For example, the family 
court may order a three-year restrictive placement while the su- 
preme court, in a similar situation, may grant probation. The 
determining factor appears to be the particular judge rather than 
the court. 
The impact of the Juvenile Offender Act is best measured by 
the number of sentences in excess of those which could be imposed 
by the family court (since every juvenile offense is also a designated 
felony the family court could order a restrictive placement of three 
or five years).l15 The specific sentences must be analyzed to deter- 
mine the sentencing pattern and, ultimately, the Act's impact on 
the juvenile justice system. 
In view of the paucity of data covering the first year in which 
the Juvenile Offender Act was effective, when only twenty-five 
youths were sentenced in New York City,"6 information was ob- 
tained from New York, Kings and Bronx counties for the period 
September 1, 1979, to December 31, 1979. When added to the 
sentences imposed during the first year, as reported by DCJS, a 
total of seventy-nine youths reached sentence in the supreme 
court."' (The first year total included citywide sentences plus the 
sentences imposed in Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the Bronx from 
September 1,1979, through December 31,1979.) Of these, twenty- 
two or twenty-eight percent of the total were placed on probation 
and fifty-seven received terms of imprisonment ranging from inde- 
terminent sentences as youthful offenders to maximum sentences of 
life imprisonment. 
Table Dn8 incorporates a complete breakdown by offense and 
sentence. Maximum sentences imposed under the Juvenile Offender 
Act are often roughly equivalent to a placement under the Family 
Court Act. A three-year term would be equivalent to a three-year 
114. Id. § 70.05 (McKinney Supp. 1980). 
115. The precise period depends upon the crime of conviction. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Am 8 
756 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1980). 
116. See DCJS REPORT, supra note 82, Table 72. 
117. See Table E. 
118. See Table D. 
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TABLE D 
Offense Probation Indefinite 1 yr. 3 yr. 4 yr. 4% yr. 4% yr. 5 yr. 6 yr. 7 yr. 7% yr. 9 yr. 10 yr. Life Totals 
Murder 2 (A-1) - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 2 3 
Rape 1 (B) 1 3 - - - 1 1 - - 1 - - - - 7 
Sodomy 1 (B) 
Robbery 1 (B) 
Robbery 2 (C) 
Burglary 2 (C) 
Arson 2 (B) 
Manslaughter 1 
(B) 
Assault 1 (C) 
Att. Murder 2 (B) 
Att. Rape 1 (C) 
Att. Robbery 2 
The minimum period of confinement is one-third the mmimum period. 
" Queens County sentences from 911179-12131179 were not available and are hence excluded. 
TABLE E 
Indeter- 
Proba- minate 
Borough tion (Y.O.) 1 yr 3 yr 4 yr 4% yr 4% yr 5 yr 6 yr 7 yr 7% yr 9 yr 10 yr Life Totals 
Bronx 6 7 - 6 1 3 - 2 2 3 - 3 1 - 34 4 
11 - - 1 1 26 - C Brooklyn 9 - 1 1 - 1 1 
Manhattan 4 - 1 2 - - 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 1 14 s 
Queens* 1 - - 2 - 1 - - 1 - - - - 5 5 * 5 h 
Totals 22 7 1 19 1 5 2 3 4 5 1 4 3 2 79 0 2 
t;j 
*Queens totals do not include sentences imposed from 9-1-79 to 12-31-79. 5 
63 
MAXIMUM SENTENCES ( UPREME COURT) : SEPTEMBER 1, 1979 THROUGH DECEMBER 31,1979 !x b 
C3 
Y 
Indeter- 
Proba- minate 
Borough tion (Y.O.) 1 yr 3 yr 4 yr 4% yr 4% yr 5 yr 6 yr 7 yr 7% yr 9 yr 10 yr Life Totals 
Bronx 6 6 - - 1 3 - - 2 2 - 2 1 - 23 
Brooklyn 11 - - 4 - 1 - 1 - 1 1 - - 1 20 
Manhattan 2 - 1 2 - - 2 1 1 - 1 - 1 11 
Totals 19 6 1 6 1 4 2 1 3 4 1 3 1 2 54 
Note: The minimum period of confinement is one-third the maximum period. 
-I o
-l 
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restrictive placement while a five-year term would be roughly 
equivalent to a five-year restrictive pla~ement."~ A maximum 
sentence beyond five years has no family court equivalent, i.e., it is 
beyond the dispositional powers of the family court. 
As indicated in Table D,120 nineteen youths received sentences 
in excess of those available to the family court (greater than five 
years) while thirty youths received maximum sentences of over 
three years. Approximately twenty-four percent of all youths sen- 
tenced in the supreme court received terms in excess of those avail- 
able to the family court. However, given the large number of 
removed cases and dismissals, only one and one-half percent of all 
youths charged with juvenile offenses received sentences in excess of 
those which would have been available had they been prosecuted 
initially in the family court. Approximately two and one-half per- 
cent of all youths arrested for juvenile offenses received sentences 
involving imprisonment for longer than the three-year maximum. 
It should be noted that under the Juvenile Offender Act youths 
sentenced in the adult courts are placed with the State Division for 
Youth, the same agency that receives children found delinquent by 
the family court.121 Although the Penal Law122 employs the term 
"imprisonment" while the Family Court Act employs the term 
"placement," the results are substantially the same.123 In short, 
most of the children sentenced in the adult felony courts spend the 
same amount of time in the same place that would have been 
available had the youth been convicted in the family court.124 
In the great majority of cases it appears not to matter whether 
the case is removed, as most are, or remains in the adult system. 
Prior to the enactment of the Juvenile Offender Act, the New York 
City Family Court was restrictively placing approximately fourteen 
percent of all youths arrested for the commission of a designated 
felony (the equivalent of the present juvenile offense). In other 
119. See N.Y. FAM. CT. Am 5 756 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1980). 
120. See Table D. 
121. Children placed by the supreme court are housed in a secure "Title 111" facility, i.e., 
a secure residential institution. So too, a family court judge may order a "Title 111" secure 
placement in appropriate cases. However, the family court may elect to place a child in a 
nonsecure facility or group home, dispositions not permitted if the youth is sentenced by the 
adult felony court. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 510-527 (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
122. N.Y. PENAL LAW 8 70 (McKinney Supp. 1980). 
123. There are differences involving, for example, the granting of home visits. Compare 
1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 510, 2 with N.Y. PENAL AW $70.04 (McKinney 1978). 
124. However, a youth incarcerated under the Juvenile Offender Act must spend the 
entire period of incarceration in a secure facility. 1978 N.Y. Laws, ch. 481, § 515-b(2). The 
practice of transferring prisoners to a nonsecure facility or half-way house, permitted under 
family court placements as well as adult sentences, is precluded by the Act. Id. 
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words, the experience prior to enactment of the Juvenile Offender 
Act was similar to experience under the Act. For the vast majority 
of children arrested for the commission of a juvenile offense, the 
result is substantially identical to that which prevailed before 1978. 
Only approximately two of every hundred youths charged with the 
commission of a juvenile offense received a greater sentence than 
was available prior to the Act's passage. 
A youth who remains in the supreme court through sentenc- 
ing, nevertheless suffers the disadvantages of an adult criminal 
record, adult prosecution and the loss of confidentiality afforded by 
the family court. Although the juvenile has lost the protections 
afforded by the family court, the Act's rationale, the imposition of 
higher sentences, has failed to materialize. 
H. Summa y 
Table F125 summarizes the experience to date in determining 
juvenile offense arrests. Of one hundred arrests, twenty-three re- 
sulted in indictment, approximately twelve in criminal convictions 
(in the adult courts), and approximately six in adult criminal court 
sentences. Most importantly, an average of only one and one-half 
percent, or three of every two hundred arrests, resulted in a sen- 
tence of greater than five years and only two percent resulted in a 
sentence greater than three years, i.e., beyond the powers of the 
family court. 
The overall picture is one of screening out of large numbers of 
children at every stage of the proceedings. Thus, the impact of the 
Act has been radically narrowed by prosecutorial, judicial and 
perhaps police discretion. In view of the results, one must question 
the Act's justification. At the very least, substantial modification is 
clearly indicated. 
I. Statistical Update 
In April 1980 the New York State Division of Criminal Justice 
Services published a Juvenile Offender Act statistical report cover- 
ing September 1, 1979 to February 29, 1980.126 Summarily, there 
are only two possible significant statistical changes that occurred 
during the six months not covered in the previous discussion. The 
total number of arrests declined, and the percentage of indicted 
cases increased. On a citywide basis, arrests declined from 762 
125. See Table I?. 
126. See N.Y.S. DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, JUNENILE OFFENDERS IN NEW 
YORK STATE, SEPTEMBER 1,  FEBR FEBRUARY 29, 1980 (April 30, 1980). 
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TABLE F 
A. Arrested 
1. Declined to prosecute 
2. Removed to Family Court 
3. Dismissed by Criminal Court 
4. Transferred to Supreme Court 
1. Not Indicted 
2. Indicted 
C. Supreme Court *(127) 23% 
1. Removed to Family Court (prior to plea) (46) 8%% 
2. Dismissed by Supreme Court (12) 2%% 
3. Disposition by Supreme Court 
a. Acquitted (1) % % 
b. Convicted (68) 12%% 
(1) Trial (10) 1% % 
(2) Plea (58) 10% % 
D. Sentence *(49) 12%% 
1. Removed to Family Court * * (24) 6% 
2. Sentenced by Supreme Court (25) 6% % 
a. Probation (3) % % 
b. Incarcerated (22) 
(1) Consistent with Family Court (17) 4%% 
(2) Inconsistent with Family Court (5) 1%% 
* Remaining Cases are Pending 
**Based upon statistics covering nine months (See CJA study, p. 32) and 
projected to one year. 
Note: Sentences by Supreme Court covering a fifteen month period, 9/11 
78 - 12131179. 
a. Probation (22) 1% % 
b. Incarceration (57) 
(1) Consistent with F. C. (38) 3% 
(2) Inconsistent with F. C. (19) 1 % % 
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(September 1, 1978 to February 28, 1979) to 637 (September 1, 
1979 to February 29, 1980), a sixteen percent decrease.lZ7 The 
reduction may be the result of careful case screening, as suggested 
by the report. The decrease may also be the result of a police 
reaction against the high rate of later removals to the family court. 
Why devote the extra resources needed to charge a juvenile offense, 
including the police time needed to book and arraign a juvenile 
offender, only to have the case removed? The arrest pattern, how- 
ever, remained relatively constant. For example, robbery ac- 
counted for seventy-six percent of all arrests and burglary ac- 
counted for only two percent of juvenile offender charges (fifty-six 
of two thousand eighty-nine) . lZs 
On the other hand, the percentage of cases reaching indict- 
ment increased. When pending cases are included in the statistical 
base, the percentage of indicted cases jumped from twenty-three to 
thirty-three.lZ9 However, three percent of the citywide arrests 
were reported as "unconfirmed arrest reports," i.e., the Division 
could not ascertain the results of the arrests.130 That compares to 
an almost total absence of unconfirmed reports from previous pe- 
riods. Since almost all unconfirmed arrest reports probably in- 
volved declinations to prosecute or dismissals (it is unlikely that 
indictments would be "lost," and declinations to prosecute immedi- 
ately terminate the case), the actual indictment rate was probably 
twenty-nine percent. Not surprisingly, the percentage of cases re- 
moved to the family court declined by a percentage approximately 
equal to the rise in indictments. 
It appears that, by limiting arrests, the percentage of indict- 
ments has increased slightly. (Some of the less serious cases, which 
would have been dismissed or removed, have been screened before 
a case was initiated.) This occurrence is confirmed by the fact that 
the number of indictments, as opposed to the percentage, remained 
almost constant. The system has apparently adjusted to avoid the 
needless prosecution in the adult criminal courts of those children 
whose cases will, in any event, be determined in the family court. 
In conclusion, the Report confirms, for the most part, the evalua- 
tions and conclusions based upon earlier statistics. 
IV. ANALYSIS BY CRIME 
The evaluation of the Juvenile Offender Act has thus far con- 
centrated on longitudinal events such as arrest, removal, indict- 
127. Id. 
128. Id. Table 3. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
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ment, and disposition. This section analyzes the Act's implementa- 
tion of arrest by crime. Four separate offenses have been selected 
for detailed analysis: burglary, second-degree robbery, first-degree 
robbery, and murder. The four selected crimes account for eighty 
percent of all juvenile offender arrests in New York City131 and, in 
view of the absence of burglary arrests, probably account for an 
even greater percentage of committed juvenile 0ffen~es. l~~ 
Burglary is notable for its absence from the juvenile offender 
arrest base. Only thirty-six of approximately 3,200 youths arrested 
for burglary during the year were charged with the juvenile offense 
of first- or second-degree b~rg1a ry . l~~  The Act has simply not been 
applied to that crime, a phenomenon that conflicts with the Act's 
legislative intent. In the absence of arrests, every other statistic, 
such as dismissal, removal, indictment, and sentencing, is meaning- 
less. Burglary exists only as a "paper" juvenile offense. From a 
prosecutorial or a defense viewpoint, the commission of the crime 
results in an automatic "removal" to the family court even prior to 
arrest. 
One result of the failure to charge criminally is that a given 
burglary case can be processed in the family court expeditiously, 
without the necessity of drafting a criminal charge, scheduling a 
removal hearing or applying rigorous criminal procedural stan- 
dards. The accused juvenile confronts only a delinquency charge 
which precludes either a juvenile offense sentence or a designated 
felony restrictive placement. The inclusion in the Act of burglary, 
the only nonviolent juvenile offense, seems no longer logical. 
B. Second-Degree Robbery 
Second-degree robbery is a serious crime, albeit less severe 
than first-degree robbery, assault, rape or h 0 m i ~ i d e . l ~ ~  Since 453 
131. See DCJS REPORT, supra note 82, Table 63. 
132. The greatest number of arrests, 76% of the total, involve robbery. Id. Burglary has 
been included because of its prevalence, even though few juveniles are charged with that 
offense. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra. hfurder is included as an example of the 
most violent and serious crime. 
133. DCJS REPORT, supra note 82, Table 63. See also text accompanying notes 87-93 
supra. 
134. Second-degree robbery does not include the use of a "deadly weapon" or a "dan- 
gerous instrument" or, alternatively, result in "serious physical injury." See N.Y. PENAL LAW 
6 160.10 (McKinney 1975). 
135. See DCJS REPORT, supm note 82, Table 63. 
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youths were charged with the crime135 in New York City during the 
first year one can assume that, unlike burglary charges, the police 
did not substantially undercharge or refuse to file robbery charges. 
Table incorporates a comparative analysis for the crimes 
of murder, first-degree robbery, and second-degree robbery based 
on the first nine months' experience under the Act (September 1, 
1978, through May 31, 1979). Only thirteen percent of all youths 
arrested for second-degree robbery were indicted, while forty-eight 
percent were removed to the family court, twenty-one percent were 
not prosecuted, ten percent were dismissed, and the grand jury 
refused to indict eight percent. A substantial number of those for 
whom there was a declination to prosecute or failure to indict were 
TABLE G 
DISPOSITION OF ARRESTS: SEPTEMBER 1, 1978-MAY 31, 1979 
For All 
Offenses Murder 2 Robbery 1 Robbery 2 
A. Arrest (1069) 100% (23) 100% (440) 100% (367) 100% 
1. Decline to Prosecute (193) 18% (1) 4% (65) 15% (77) 21% 
2. Remove to Family Court (431) 41 % (2) 9 % (169) 38 % (177) 48 % 
3. Dismiss by Criminal Court (134) 12% (3) 13% (66) 15% (36) 10% 
4. Transfer to Supreme Court (305) 24% (17) 74% (140) 32% (77) 21 % 
B. Grand Jury (270*) 29% (17) 74% (140) 32% (77) 21% 
1. Not indict (57) 6% (3) 13% (41) 9% (31) 8% 
a. Remove to Family Court (43) (1) (7) (10) 
b. Other (includes dismiss) (14) (2) (34) (21) 
2. Indict (213) 23% (14) 61 % (99) 23% (46) 13% 
C. Supreme Court (105*) 23% (3') 61% (27*) 23% (38*) 13% 
1. Remove to Family Court 
(Prior to plea) (6) 1% % (0) (4) 3%% (1) ?A% 
2. Dismiss by Supreme Court (8) 1% % -** - **  - ** 
3. Disposition (91) 20% (3) 61% (23) 19%% (37) 12%% 
a. Acquittal (0) Too few sen- 
tenced to give 
reliable sta- 
tistics. 
b. Conviction 
(1) Trial (7) 
(2) Plea (84) 
*Differences accounted for by pending cases and lost records 
**Not available by Offense 
136. See Table G. 
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probably refiled in the family court. Close to nine out of ten cases 
failed to reach the adult felony court. 
The precise disposition of those robbery cases that proceeded 
to sentence in the adult felony court (thirteen percent of the total) is 
outlined in Table HI3' (covering the period of September 1, 1979 
through December 31,1979). It should be noted, however, that the 
sentencing data are based upon convictions and do not reflect those 
cases that may have involved more serious arrest charges. Neverthe- 
less, only one youth who was convicted of second-degree robbery 
during that period received a sentence with a maximum term of 
imprisonment in excess of five years, i.e., a term longer than the 
family court's statutory authority. By way of contrast, sixty-four 
percent of the children convicted of second-degree robbery in the 
adult felony court received a sentence of probation. Thus, lengthy 
incarceration, a possibility not available in the absence of the Juve- 
nile Offender Act, is almost never used. Adult criminal courts do 
not treat second-degree juvenile robberies as a crime warranting 
severe or adult sanctions. 
Essentially, burglary cases never even reached the lower crimi- 
nal court, while most second-degree robbery cases were either 
screened out before they reached the felony court or, if not, were 
treated leniently within the adult system. But despite the availabil- 
ity of later lenient treatment there was a loss of confidentiality, the 
TABLE H 
Selected Juvenile Offenses 
New York, Kings and Bronx Counties 
All J.O. 
Offenses Murder 2 Robbery 1 Robbery 2 
Total Sentenced by Supreme 
Court 
(a) Probation 
(b) Incarceration 
(1) Consistent with 
Family Court 
(2) Inconsistent with 
Family Court 
137. See Table H. 
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comparative harshness and difficulties of preliminary adult crimi- 
nal processing, and the time and financial resources wasted through 
an adult prosecution destined to be cut short or substituted by a 
family court proceeding. 
Surely, the Act's purpose could not have been the encourage- 
ment of preliminary adult criminal prosecution followed by a juve- 
nile delinquency proceeding or an adult disposition identical to that 
frequently imposed in the family court. But, with second-degree 
robbery, the system has reacted, when confronted with the di- 
lemma of initiating a juvenile offense proceeding or a nondesig- 
nated felony prosecution (by undercharging), by initiating adult 
charges and subsequently removing the case. 
C .  First-Degree Robbery 
By definition, first-degree robbery is a more violent crime than 
second-degree robbery or burglary, but less serious than homicide 
or a felonious sex offense. It  is also the most prevalent juvenile 
crime accounting for almost one-half (forty-five percent) of city- 
wide juvenile offense arrests.'38 It is not surprising that first-degree 
robbery statistics approximate the average for all juvenile offenses. 
For example, twenty-three percent of the cases result in grand jury 
indictment, precisely the average percentage for all cases.139 The 
percentages of cases removed to the family court, dismissed or not 
prosecuted, are also similar to the averages. The sentencing pattern 
for first-degree robbery parallels the average for all juvenile of- 
fenses.140 Approximately twelve percent of all juvenile offense ar- 
rests reach the adult sentencing stage. Of those that are first-degree 
robbery arrests, approximately two-thirds result in incarcera- 
tion.141 Eight percent of first-degree robbery arrestees are impris- 
oned by the adult criminal courts. 
In summary, most first-degree robbery cases are dismissed or 
referred to the family court. However, the adult system retains a 
significant number and for these, the sentences are frequently sub- 
stantial. Unlike the case of burglary or second-degree robbery, the 
Juvenile Offender Act has increased the penalty for first-degree 
robbery. Viewed from the perspective of results, the possibility of 
138. See DCJS REWRT, supra note 82, Table 63. 
139. See Table G. 
140. Id. 
141. See Tables F & H. Half of the cases are removed to the family court for disposition 
purposes only and approximately half the cases remaining in the Supreme Court result in 
incarceration. See Table F. 
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adult prosecution should remain, although a better system is 
needed to screen those cases that should not proceed criminally. 
D. Murder 
Second-degree murder, the last crime selected for analysis, 
represents the most serious juvenile offense. It is not surprising that 
sixty-one percent of all arrests resulted in indictment142 and the 
criminal courts removed only nine percent to the family court. 
Murder is the only juvenile offense for which adult prosecution is 
the rule rather than the exception. It is the only crime for which an 
arrested youth faces the probability of prosecution and sentencing 
in adult felony court. As of December 31, 1979, only three second- 
degree murder convictions had reached the sentencing stage. 113 All 
three youths received lengthy sentences: two received a maximum 
term of life imprisonment. 
In summary, the Act's effectiveness, as measured by arrests 
and disposition data, varies considerably by offense. The general 
juvenile offense averages, as reported in earlier chapters, including 
a twenty-three percent indictment rate, a twelve percent conviction 
rate, and a six percent sentence rate in the adult felony court, apply 
only to first-degree robbery arrests. The finding that less than two 
of each hundred youths arrested for the commission of a juvenile 
offense will be incarcerated for a period of time in excess of that 
available prior to the enactment of the Juvenile Offender Act masks 
the wide divergence by crime. 
The finding that the Act has been meaningless when applied to 
burglary (or, based on apparent undercharging, the Act has ad- 
versely affected prosecution and conviction) and close to meaning- 
less when applied to second-degree robbery is significant. If the Act 
were amended to exclude the crimes in question (second-degree 
robbery, first- and second-degree burglary) the result in effective 
prosecution and sentencing, would not change. In other words, 
when viewed by results, it matters not whether those particular 
crimes are juvenile offenses. 
First-degree robbery represents the average juvenile offense. 
For the approximately two percent of the youths convicted for the 
crime and sentenced to maximum terms in excess of five years and, 
perhaps, the approximately three percent sentenced to maximum 
terms greater than three years, the Act represents a substantial 
difference. On the other hand, the great majority of first-degree 
142. See Table G.  
143. See Table H .  
Heinonline - -  26 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 716 1981 
19811 JWENILE OFFENDER ACT 717 
robbery cases are removed, dismissed, or result in relatively minor 
sentences, frequently after intensive adult criminal prosecution. 
Given these facts, the value of mandated initial adult prosecution is 
questionable. 
Lastly, murder cases represent the other side of the spectrum 
in prosecution and sentencing effectiveness. Since sixty-one percent 
of murder arrests have resulted in indictment (most of the remain- 
der are dismissed rather than removed) and since every conviction 
appears to result in a substantial sentence, the Act's impact has 
been great. At least from a purely result-oriented viewpoint, the 
ability to prosecute second-degree murder cases criminally should 
be continued in some form. 
The Juvenile Offender Act constitutes the most radical change 
in New York's delinquency laws since the establishment of the 
Children's Court in 1922, or perhaps the 1909 abolition of criminal 
~ena1ties.l~~ For the first time in seventy years a child may be 
criminally prosecuted and incarcerated in adult penal institutions 
for offenses committed prior to attaining the age of sixteen.145 In 
fact, by severely limiting the discretion of the courts (as opposed to 
the prosecutor) to sentence or place children in nonpenal programs, 
the Act imposes a harsher remedy for some cases than the statutes 
which were in effect from 1824 until 1909. 
New York stands alone in lowering the age of criminal respon- 
sibility to or fourteen years of age.147 No other state 
routinely applies criminal procedures to cases involving younger 
adolescents. Moreover, the Juvenile Offender Act reverses the prac- 
tice found in every other state of initiating delinquency cases only in 
the juvenile courts, subject, in many jurisdictions, to criminal court 
transfer in accordance with statutorily enumerated standards. His- 
torically New York, by maintaining a juvenile court age limitation 
of sixteen has, unlike most other jurisdictions, applied criminal 
144. See notes 20-27 and accompanying text supra. The 1962 establishment of the Family 
Court Act, 1962 N.Y. Laws, ch. 686, the last major amendment prior to 1978, did not 
materially affect the treatment or confinement of children. See Besharov, Practice Commen- 
taries, in N.Y. FAM. CT. Am art. 1 (McKinney 1975). 
145. See N.Y. PENAL LAW 5 10.00 (McKinney Supp. 1980). 
146. The age of criminal responsibility is 13 for murder. Id. § 30.00(2). 
147. Id. The only exception is murder: several states permit the criminal prosecution of 
14-and 15-year-olds accused of murder. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 8 26-701 (1976) (Commit- 
tee Notes); MD. CTS & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(d)(1)(4) (Supp. 1979). See generally 
DAVIS, supra note 33, $5 2.2, .lo. 
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sanctions to older children.1ds The Juvenile Offender Act applies 
equivalent provisions to younger children. 
The distinction between originating an action in the juvenile 
court with possible transfer to the adult criminal court and origi- 
nating actions in the adult system with possible removal to the 
juvenile court should be clearly understood. Only the juvenile or 
family court can protect children from publicity. Criminal proce- 
dure is primarily designed to protect society even when the needs of 
the defendant may outweigh society's need for such protection. 
Probation case adjustment is precluded and the case is processed in 
a far more formalistic, adversarial environment. The prosecutor is 
granted greater authority in determining the outcome of the case. 
For example, the district attorney must consent to the entering of a 
plea to a lesser offense. Further, the social services that may be 
available to the family court cannot be used. For all these reasons, 
every state except New York has elected to begin delinquency cases 
only in the juvenile courts regardless of the initial charge. 
The fact that only twelve percent of all juvenile offender cases 
reach the conviction stage in the adult court and half of those are 
removed to the family court for sentencing is, in itself, a cogent 
reason to reassess the Act. The inefficiency of successive proceedings 
in different courts and the possible prejudice to accused children 
militates in favor of alternative filing or screening mechanisms.140 
When the Act's application to specific crimes, such as burglary or 
robbery, is evaluated, the need for alternatives is even more mani- 
fest. 
The Juvenile Offender Act has been in effect for two years, 
and most of the analysis incorporated in this report is based largely 
on the first year's experience. Yet a sufficiently strong pattern has 
emerged to warrant alternatives. The recommendations that follow 
are based on the Act's practical deficiencies. Whether or not the 
reader agrees with the law's philosophy and purpose, the Act 
clearly does not work when applied to several crimes such as bur- 
glary and second-degree robbery. On the other hand, it has signifi- 
cantly altered the processing and disposition of the very serious 
violent crimes, such as homicide. However, for these cases too, 
modifications seem necessary, considering the very young children 
involved. 
Recommendations are based on the assumption that the Act 
should be restructured. At a minimum, the Act is overbroad. It fails 
148. See text accompanying notes 72-79 supra. 
149. The inefficiency of prolonged and duplicative proceedings under the Act hns been 
analyzed in a recent report. See Roysher & Edelman, Treating Juveniles As Adults in New 
York: What Does It Mean and How Is It Working? (unpublished report, June 24, 1980). 
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to serve its intended purpose and severely prejudices those children 
whose cases are eventually removed to the family court. The spe- 
cific recommendations are as follows. 
A. Evey juvenile offender case should be filed initially in the 
family court. 
The practice of filing juvenile offender cases in the adult crimi- 
nal courts only to have the vast majority removed to the family 
court is prejudicial to the large majority of arrested youths and 
wastes scarce resources. It may also encourage overcharging and 
grants the prosecutor plenary authority to determine the court in 
which the child will be tried. When coupled with the transfer 
provisions incorporated in recommendations D and E below, the 
proposed procedures will protect those youths, almost ninety per- 
cent of the total, whose cases are dismissed or removed, while 
insuring that the relatively small number of cases that should be 
criminally prosecuted are transferred to the adult courts for that 
purpose. 
B. The crimes of a) @st-degree burglary, b) second-degree bur- 
glary and c) second-degree ~obbery should be eliminated as 
iuvenile offenses, but retained as designated felonies. 
The experience to date indicates that burglary is rarely prose- 
cuted as a juvenile offense. Prosecution as a designated felony by 
family court will involve a possible three-year restrictive place- 
ment, a sufficiently severe sanction for a nonviolent offense. In 
fact, elimination as a juvenile offense would, as previously dis- 
cussed, increase the possible sanctions. 
Second-degree robbery cases are almost always removed to the 
family court. If not, they are treated leniently by the criminal 
courts. The crime is simply not viewed as sufficiently serious to 
warrant adult sanctions. Its continuation as a juvenile offense is not 
justified. 150 
C. The crimes of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-de- 
gree manslaughter, first-degree assault, and first-degree rob- 
b e y  should be class "A" designated felonies. 
The above crimes are presently classified as "B" designated 
felonies.lS1 If the youth is prosecuted in the family court, the 
150. Approximately 90% of second-degree robbery cases fail to reach even the adult 
felony court. See text accompanying notes 138-44 supra. 
151. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §S 125.20 (first-degree manslaughter), 130.35 (first-degree 
rape), .50 (first-degree sodomy), 160.15 (first-degree robbery) (McKinney 1975). 
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maximum penalty is therefore a three-year restrictive placement. 
Under the Juvenile Offender Act the same youth, if prosecuted in 
the criminal courts, would face a maximum sentence of from ten to 
fifteen years. 
Reclassifying the designated felony equivalents would narrow, 
though by no means eliminate, the dichotomy between the family 
court and the criminal courts thus decreasing the tendency to crimi- 
nally prosecute many youths in the adult system. However, the 
imposition of a five-year restrictive placement should be purely 
discretionary and the court should be empowered to place youths 
restrictively for either three or five years or, for that matter, refrain 
from ordering any restrictive placement. 
D. The small number of juvenile offender cases involving second- 
degree murder, first-degree manslaughter, first-degree rape, 
first-degree sodomy and first-degree arson should be transferred 
to the criminal courts at the request of the district attorney and 
only upon a finding of probable cause. 
This recommendation provides for the transfer of very serious 
cases to the adult system upon the request of the district attorney. 
The decision would be a prosecutorial one, and the court would 
lack the authority to refuse such a request. 
This alteration would continue the adult prosecution of almost 
every case involving the above crimes that are today so prosecuted. 
However, by initiating the action in the family court, those cases 
that are presently removed from the criminal courts would be 
spared such prosecution. For example, approximately forty percent 
of murder cases filed under the Act fail to reach criminal indict- 
ment. These cases would remain in the relatively protective envi- 
ronment of the family court.152 The additional requirement of a 
probable cause finding in the family court is meant to preclude, or 
at least diminish, the possibility of overcharging. 
E. Evey  other juvenile offense case should be transferrable to the 
adult criminal courts at the discretion of the family court and 
upon a request by the district attorney. 
This proposal is similar to the provisions found in most states. 
If the prosecutor concludes and convinces the court that a given 
juvenile offense warrants criminal prosecution, the case is trans- 
152. See text accompanying notes 150-56 supra. Murder cases are not immune from 
problems of proof. Also, youth's lack of culpability may result in delinquency rather than 
criminal prosecution. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 8 310.85(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
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ferred. The experience of the Juvenile Offender Act to date indi- 
cates that such a request will be made in only a small percentage of 
the cases and will probably be rarely granted. The recommenda- 
tion will nevertheless continue to permit adult prosecution of those 
few cases which justify the application of adult penalties. 
It should be noted that transfer will not be available for cases 
involving burglary or second-degree robbery (recommendation B). 
For the very serious cases, transfer will be mandatory if requested 
by the district attorney (recommendation D) . Lastly, increasing the 
family court's dispositional powers will further minimize the use of 
adult prosecution for prosecutorial, judicial or police convenience 
(recommendation C) . 
F .  The presentment or prosecution of all delinquency cases in the 
family court should be reviewed. 
The present family court Act prosecutorial provisions involv- 
ing the district attorney, corporation counsel, and county attorneys 
can best be described as a patchwork of overlapping functions. The 
national trend in recent years has been to strengthen and unify 
prosecution. In fact, if New York had ,provided more effective 
prosecutorial services, the pressure for Juvenile Offender Act enact- 
ment would have been minimized. The entire range of prosecution 
services in the family court (including those services dealing with 
persons in need of supervision and child abuse proceedings) should 
be studied with a view toward unification and increased effective- 
ness. 
These recommendations are intended to establish a better bal- 
ance between the perceived need to protect the community (by 
increasing the penalty for the violent juvenile offender) and the 
need to protect those children who should not be criminally prose- 
cuted in the adult courts. It should be stressed that the disposition 
or sentence of juvenile offenders will not be materially altered. 
Except for burglary and second-degree robbery cases (in which 
maximum penalties are virtually never imposed) the possible maxi- 
mum penalties would remain the same. 
Juvenile offender proceedings would, however, be signifi- 
cantly modified. Instead of all cases starting down the road of adult 
prosecution only to have almost all diverted, none would automati- 
cally start down that road, and only those cases which should be 
criminally treated would be referred, with appropriate safeguards, 
to the criminal system. The overwhelming majority of accused 
juvenile offenders, whose cases are currently diverted from the 
criminal system, would thereby gain the protection inherent in 
juvenile courts. The ability to prescribe stringent penalties would 
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not suffer, but procedures would follow a more logical and equita- 
ble progression. The recommendations would also place New York 
closer to the mainstream of current American juvenile jurispru- 
d e n ~ e . ' ~ ~  
The fact that most juvenile offender cases, indeed almost all 
nonhomicide cases, do not remain before the adult criminal courts 
(or, at most, result in sentences within the statutory authority of the 
family court) indicates the good sense of the officials responsible for 
implementing the Act. There is no reason, however, to continue to 
hobble the system with inefficient and inequitable procedures. Ac- 
cordingly, the Act should be substantially modified to protect the 
vast majority of children who do not require the severity of adult 
criminal prosecution or punishment. 
153. Initiating cases in the family court, with appropriate transfer provisions, would 
yield additional benefits. The duplication and wastefulness of removing cases would be 
eliminated. More importantly the time needed to reach disposition in the family court is 
shorter than the criminal courts. Initiating the action in the family court would expedite the 
process. It  is surely more efficient to maintain actions in one court instead of removing, 
transferring, or dismissing over 90% of the cases prior to disposition. For most youths, the 
modifications would also increase the feasibility of assigning a single defense attorney from 
beginning to end (and a single prosecutor or assistant district attorney). 
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